This paper investigates the impact of individuals' social identities on their tax attitudes, and how these effects on the micro level are translated to the impact of a country's ethnic heterogeneity on the public's overall tax morale. We find that both ethnic and national identities play important roles shaping tax morale, and these effects depend on the country's population heterogeneity.
Introduction
This study examines how social identities -one's (perceived) membership in social groups -and ethnic heterogeneity of a country affects tax morale. Tax morale, i.e., the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes, is an important determinant of tax compliance. Conventional economic theories model tax compliance decisions as balancing the tradeoff between the benefit of a lower tax burden and the cost of penalties for noncompliance (Allingham and Sandmo 1972) . Empirical studies, however, find a higher level of compliance than theory predictions (i.e., voluntary overcompliance). Researchers try to reconcile this discrepancy by incorporating social factors into the analysis, such as social norms, morality, perceptions of fairness and trust. This paper introduces two new factors, social identities and ethnic heterogeneity, and shows that they play important roles in shaping tax morale. The results offer insights for researchers to better understand reasons for tax evasion on the one hand and voluntary overcompliance on the other (Feld and Frey 2002) .
We use data from the European and World Values Surveys which encompass national representative samples from sixty seven countries and contain information on moral acceptability of tax cheating, respondents' ethnic backgrounds, and national identity. The comprehensive information in the Surveys allows us to differentiate the internal and external evidence of the impact of social identities, with the former based on self-identification as a citizen of the country, and the latter based on racial, linguistic and religious characteristics observed by the survey interviewers. When studying the external evidence of social identities, we introduce a majority versus minority classification. Survey respondents are categorized as majority group if they belong to the largest ethnic group and the most popular religious denomination, and speak the country's most commonly used language at home. Otherwise, they are categorized as minority groups of that country. This classification captures important differences in the groups' tastes for public spending or political dominance which can cause different intrinsic tax attitudes.
We find that on average residents show lower tax morale in ethnically heterogeneous countries than in homogeneous ones, consistent with the quote above. This aggregate impact of ethnic heterogeneity is driven by how taxpayers' individual social identities affect their tax morale. We find that all else equal, those from ethnic majority groups have significantly higher tax morale than minority groups. Since ethnically heterogeneous countries have more minority groups (by definition), this individual-level difference aggregates to explain the country-level difference. In addition, those who self identify as citizens show stronger tax morale than those who do not. The effects of identities are contingent on the country's ethnic fractionalization.
This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we make a connection between the micro evidence on individual compliance attitudes and the aggregate evidence on the country's tax morale. It allows us to study how the effects of ethnic identities on individuals' tax attitudes are translated to an impact of ethnic heterogeneity on the public's overall tax morale.
Our findings link to a growing literature that documents the detrimental impacts of ethnic fractionalization on government's redistributive spending and public sector performance. We discuss this literature in section 2. Our study suggests a micro mechanism for this finding. Since people are more willing to pay taxes to finance a public sector that benefits their own group and are reluctant to bear the economic cost for other groups, ethnic fractionalization undermines the public's tax morale by eroding their altruism and sense of mutual obligation, and hence increases the probability of noncompliance. As a result, ethnically fractionalized countries are more likely to face a higher cost of tax collection, which restricts funds for their public sector.
Second, this study fills a gap in the economic literature on social identity by identifying a non-experimental data source, and differentiating the internal and external evidence of the impact of social identities. Social identity theory was developed by Tajfel and Turner (1986) to understand the psychological basis for intergroup discrimination. In economics, research interest on identity has been growing since the seminal work by Akerlof and Kranton (2000) . Nevertheless, the current empirical literature on identity focuses on a limited range of topics, such as discrimination (Fershtman and Gneezy 2001) and social preferences (Chen and Li 2009 ).
These studies rely on an experimental approach of data collection, and many of them focus on groups induced in laboratory settings. In contrast, this paper identifies a non-experimental data source, and focuses on naturally occurring identities -ethnic and national identities -rather than artificially induced ones. We study the impact of identities on tax morale, a topic underexplored in the literature due to data limitations. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that compares and contrasts the internal and external evidence of identities. Our results show that the two dimensions of identities, one internalized by individuals and the other one externally observable to others, play important but different roles in shaping tax morale.
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows. Section 2 presents research questions and hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4 presents empirical analyses and results. Section 5 concludes and discusses policy implications.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The main questions we investigate include how individual's social identities affect tax attitudes, and how these effects on the micro level are translated to an impact of ethnic fractionalization on the public's overall tax morale. In this section, we discuss the literature, and formulate our hypotheses based on what the previous findings suggest.
An expanding literature in economics documents that inter-ethnic-group preferences affect voter choices on public spending. For example, Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) show that the share of spending on productive public goods in U.S. urban areas is inversely related to the ethnic fragmentation of the communities. Luttmer (2001) finds that people increase their support for welfare spending as the share of local recipients from their own racial group rises. In a cross-country analysis, Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) find an inverse relationship between the size of government redistributive spending and the country's ethnic fragmentation.
Many subsequent studies attribute these phenomena to intergroup bias -people favor policies that are beneficial to their own ethnic groups and withdraw support for policies that mostly benefit other groups (see Alesina and La Ferrara 2005 for a review). In an experimental study conducted in Uganda, Habyarimana et al. (2007) find evidence for 'strategy selection' (coethnics play cooperative equilibria whereas non-co-ethnics do not) and 'technology' mechanisms (co-ethnics are more closely linked on social networks and thus better able to support cooperation through the threat of social sanction), but no evidence for 'preference' mechanisms (common tastes or a greater degree of altruism within ethnic groups).
Since tax is the major revenue source for public spending, the intergroup bias may also influence one's willingness to pay taxes. As British Conservative politician David Willets commented in the quote above, people pay taxes to help others who are like themselves. When a society becomes more diverse and beneficiaries of public policies are more likely to come from different ethnic groups, taxpayers will question '[w]hy should I pay for them when they are doing things that I wouldn't do?' (Willets 1998) . This comment suggests that an increase in ethnic heterogeneity may adversely affect tax morale. If taxpayers pay partially out of the motive to help others that are similar to them, ethnic heterogeneity may erode mutual obligation, weaken the public's tax morale, and cause an increase in evasion.
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There is some evidence in the literature that suggests a connection between ethnic heterogeneity and a low tax compliance rate.
La Porta et al. (1999) and Alesina et al. (2003) use cross-national approaches to examine determinants of government efficiency, including levels of tax compliance. Both studies find a negative effect of ethnic heterogeneity on tax compliance, although the estimates are sensitive to the empirical specifications. This body of research motivates the first hypothesis.
H1. The public's overall tax morale is inversely related to its ethnic heterogeneity.
As discussed earlier, the adverse impact of ethnic heterogeneity on tax morale can be attributed to intergroup discrimination -individuals favor policies that offer beneficial treatment to their own ethnic groups, and withdraw support for other groups. In other words, individuals' tax morale is affected by their own social identities (e.g., ethnic identities).
1 Voters may sometimes seek to modify tax codes through the legal process and change the purposes for which taxes are used. For example, residents in Prince George's County, Maryland, passed a law in 1978 imposing a ceiling on the tax for school financing in response to an influx of a large black middle class that had made the county much more heterogeneous (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 1999, 1244 North American countries use skin tone to differentiate ethnicities. As the result, the number of identified ethnic groups varies in a wide range from a few to several hundred from country to country, which makes it practically impossible to study any universal patterns on how ethnic identities influence tax morale.
To circumvent this difficulty and to unify the drastically different ethnic classifications across countries, we construct a new classification -ethnic majority groups or minority groups.
An identified ethnic group can be categorized as either the country's majority or minority groups. We hypothesize that ethnic minorities and majorities may have different tax morale due to three reasons: intergroup bias, heterogeneous tastes and political disadvantage. We note that not all these reasons are applicable to all the countries we include in our dataset, but we believe that at least one of them (and possibly more) applies for each country. Frey and Torgler (2007) suggest that conditional cooperation is an important factor influencing tax morale. Studies in psychology and experimental economics also show that social preferences (e.g., altruism) and conditional cooperation are stronger within social groups than across the groups -an effect termed intergroup bias (Tajfel and Turner 1986 surveys much of this research; specific studies include Charness, Rigotti and Rustichini 2007; Chen and Li 2009 ).
Since some benefits to public spending are enjoyed equally by all citizens, and by definition, the ethnic majority is more similar to the majority of all citizens and thus feels more altruism toward them and more conditional cooperation with them, majority groups are likely to experience stronger approval for public spending and thus have higher tax morale.
Furthermore, some forms of public spending differentially benefit different groups in the population. When public spending can be targeted at different groups, individuals in the ethnic majority are more likely to receive the benefits than are individuals in the ethnic minority. Since minority and majority groups are likely to have different tastes over public spending, and majority groups' preferences are more likely to determine the outcome, minority groups would experience lower tax morale. Indeed, previous studies show that individuals' support for public spending may be (partially) driven by group loyalty or heterogeneous tastes over public spending (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 1999; Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote 2001; Luttmer 2001 ).
Finally, in some societies (but not all) minority groups are less politically and economically advantaged than the majority groups. The former's experience or perception of being treated unfairly can cause mistrust of the political system and the government. This perception of unfairness may lead to low tax morale. Spicer and Becker (1980) show that tax cheating can be rationalized as a device to restore equity when the tax system is perceived to be unfair. These three arguments thus lead to hypothesis 2.
H2. Taxpayers from the ethnic majority group will show higher tax morale than those from minority groups within a country.
Citizenry is another dimension of social identities that have important impact on tax morale. Graetz and Wilde (1985) suggest that a high compliance rate can be explained by taxpayers' respect for the law as citizens. Wenzel (2002) finds that a taxpayer's national identity as an Australian citizen has a positive impact on tax compliance attitude. The data used in this paper allows us to separate the effect of the citizen identity from that of the ethnic identities. This leads to hypothesis 3.
H3. Conditional on ethnic characteristics, taxpayers who have a strong citizen identity
will show higher tax morale than their counterparts.
We also hypothesize that the effects of identities may be contingent on the population heterogeneity and vary across societies. For example, we expect the majority ethnic groups' tax morale to differ between a homogeneous country and a heterogeneous country. The role that citizen identity plays may be different across countries that have different degrees of heterogeneity. This leads to hypothesis 4.
H4. The effects of identities on tax morale will be contingent on the heterogeneity of the population in the country.
These hypotheses will be tested using the European and World Values Surveys data.
Data
The main source of data is the European and World Values Surveys (EWVS) wave 4 (1999- The average sample size is about 1,400 individuals per country with a standard deviation of 648.
Tax morale
The tax morale measure is constructed based on the question about noncompliance attitudes (denoted as CheatTax). In the survey respondents are asked to rate, on a one-to-ten scale, the extent to which they think cheating on taxes is justifiable. The actual wording is, "[p]lease tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified (scale 10), never be justified (1), or something in between… Cheating on taxes if you have a chance." The response reflects one's willingness to cheat on taxes when an opportunity is available, i.e., tax morale. The lower the score the higher the tax morale.
The distribution of the CheatTax variable is right skewed. Pooling all the countries, we find that 63 percent of respondents consider tax cheating as never justifiable (scale 1). Ten percent of respondents choose scale 5 or higher and consider tax cheating justifiable to a large extent. In the cross-country aggregate analysis, we construct an average tax morale variable (AvgCheatTax) for each country using the weights that reflect the national distributions of key demographic variables. The mean of AvgCheatTax is 2.27, with a standard deviation of 0.71.
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A preliminary look at the AvgCheatTax data suggests that countries with poor tax morale are likely to have a heterogeneous population. Consider the twelve countries for which AvgCheatTax is at least one standard deviation above the sample mean, i.e., Russia, France, the Philippines, Greece, Estonia, Luxembourg, Ukraine, Uganda, Belgium, Lithuania, Moldova and Belarus. Six of them are former Soviet Union countries and most of the other six countries have a highly heterogeneous population. Uganda, one of the most heterogeneous countries in the world, has an AvgCheatTax equal to 3.4. The Philippines is a very linguistically diversified country, where a population of 81 million speaks about 170 different languages. It has a high AvgCheatTax score of 3.14. Belgium and Luxemburg, with AvgCheatTax 3.66 and 3.38, respectively, have the most diversified populations both ethnically and linguistically among the OECD countries. On the contrary, highly homogeneous countries, such as Bangladesh, Japan, Malta, and South Korea, have high tax morale. Their AvgCheatTax values are towards the far low end (i.e., cheating on tax being perceived as unjustifiable) in the distribution. This pattern implies a negative correlation between ethnic heterogeneity and tax morale across countries.
Ethnic majority versus minority
For ethnic identities, we introduce a variable called
Majority to categorize respondents as belonging to an ethnic majority group in their country based on their racial, linguistic and religious backgrounds. During the survey interviewers coded respondents' racial characteristics by observations.
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Respondents were also asked what language they normally spoke at home and whether they belonged to a religious denomination (if yes, which religious denomination).
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To validate the classifications of racial, linguistic and religious groups in the surveys, we crosscheck with Encyclopedia Britannica (2000) and the CIA World Factbook (2000), two commonly used sources in the field, and find they are highly consistent.
For every country we identify the largest racial group, the most commonly spoken language, and the most popular religious denomination. We construct an ethnic identity variable called Majority defined as the dominant ethnic groups of that country. The baseline Majority variable is a composite measure. It is set to be one for people who belong to the largest racial group and the most popular religious denomination, and speak the most widely used language at home.
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The minority groups are comprised of those for whom at least one of the three criteria fails to be met. In atheist countries religious people are considered to be minorities. If the largest groups share similar sizes they are all treated as majority groups.
7
Complementary to this composite measure of Majority based on the combination of racial, linguistic and religious characteristics, alternative measures are constructed in a similar way by using the three characteristics separately. Table 1 presents information on race, language and religion, based on which the Majority variable is generated for each country.
[ Table 1 about here.]
Citizen identity
The citizen identity variable (Citizen) is constructed based on a closed-ended question that asked respondents whether they would best describe themselves as being a citizen of the country, or being a member of some ethnic groups. For example, in the U.S. survey respondents were asked whether they best described themselves as (1) Hispanic American, (2) black American, (3) white American, (4) Asian American, or (5) an American citizen first and a member of some ethnic group second.
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The Citizen variable takes a value of one if the respondent best describes herself as a citizen or as citizen first, and is zero otherwise.
This measure differs from the racial identity variable since Citizen was based on respondents'
self-identification and the racial variable was coded by the interviewers.
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Citizen identity over and above sub-national ethnic identity reflects one's identification with and respect for the 6 As an alternative to the commonly spoken language, we also use the official language when constructing the Majority variable. Using the official language makes very little difference in the results. 7 The proportions of groups are reported in Table 1 country's policies including its tax policies, and therefore is expected to have an important impact on one's tax attitude. ( 1) where s gc denotes the share of ethnic group g in country c. The index measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals from the population will come from different ethnic groups. The index varies from zero to one. The larger the number of different groups and the more groups with equal size, the greater the fractionalization index.
Ethnic fractionalization
We use the ethnolinguistic (ELF) fractionalization index constructed by La Porta et al.
(1999) and the three separate fractionalization measures based on ethnicity, language and religion, respectively, constructed by Alesina et al. (2003) . These variables will be discussed in section 4 where we present the empirical strategies.
Empirical Analysis and Results
In this section, we first investigate the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and aggregate level of tax morale across countries (hypothesis 1). We then use the pooled cross-national analysis on the micro level to test hypotheses 2 -4. We present the results for the U.S.
separately in subsection 4.3, since they offer complementary evidence for numerous studies in the tax compliance literature that focus on the U.S. data (Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein 1998, and Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2002 survey much of this research.)
Ethnic Fractionalization and Aggregate Tax Morale: A Country-Level Analysis
We use OLS to analyze the impact of a country's ethnic fractionalization on the overall tax morale. The empirical specification is given by:
where AvgCheatTax c is the average acceptance of tax cheating in country c. The higher the scale the more justifiable the respondents consider tax cheating. The key explanatory variable Fract c is ethnic fractionalization. We use the ELF index obtained from La Porta et al. (1999) and ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalizations from Alesina et al. (2003) alternatively.
To test the robustness of the effect of the Fract index, we examine various specifications.
Specification (1) is the baseline that includes only the logarithm of per capita tax revenues, log(PC tax revenues), in addition to Fract c .
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Our hypothesis is that heavy tax burdens may exacerbate the public's tax morale. Previous studies find that the taxpayer's perception of the fairness of his tax burden is an important social factor that affects tax compliance (e.g., Spicer
and Becker 1980). Alm and Torgler (2006) find that a country's tax morale and tax burden are negatively (but insignificantly) correlated. Specification (2) adds legal origin variables since the preliminary observations of the AvgCheatTax data in section 3 suggests that a country's political institution may affect tax morale. We follow La Porta et al. (1999) and Alesina et al. (2003) , and categorize a country's legal origin based on the national commercial legal traditions into common law, French civil law, German civil law, Scandinavian law, and socialist law. We hypothesize that people in the countries with socialist law may be more likely to consider tax cheating justifiable since the primary goal of socialist law is to maintain the State's control over economic resources (La Porta et al. 1999 These results suggest that all else being equal, ethnically fractionalized countries tend to have a higher level of noncompliance attitude than homogeneous countries.
[ By 1998 this share had increased to 27 percent. Assuming current trends continue, the Bureau of the Census projects that these groups will account for almost half of the U.S. population by 2050.
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As the result the ELF index would be more than doubled in the U.S., increasing from the current level of 0.21 to 0.48. Another hypothetical example compares Bangladesh and Uganda.
Bangladesh (ELF about zero) is one of the most homogeneous countries in the world whereas Uganda (ELF 0.84) is among the most heterogeneous ones. Our estimates in column (4) of Panel
i) implies that if Bangladesh were to have a population as diversified as in Uganda its
AvgCheatTax would be doubled, rising from 1.06 to 2.02. Alesina et al. (2003) . The democracy index enters with a positive sign (the significance level changes from 1 percent to 10 percent after we control for the geographic dummies and the Gini coefficient), suggesting a negative correlation between tax morale and the degree of democracy. Although this result is inconsistent with Torgler (2005) and Alm and Torgler (2006) we conjecture that this negative correlation may reflect the fact that people have more freedom in expressing their dissatisfaction about the public services and tax system in democratic countries compared to those in less democratic countries. Finally, the geographic differences in tax attitude are not statistically significant after we control for fractionalization, tax burden, legal origin, democracy index, and the Gini coefficient. When the ELF index is replaced by other Fract variables, the results largely follow the same pattern.
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The finding that ethnically heterogeneous countries have lower levels of tax morale supports hypothesis 1. In comparison with La Porta et al. (1999) and Alesina et al. (2003) , the results in this paper are robust across different specifications.
Effect of Social Identities: A Pooled Cross-National Microanalysis
In this subsection the focus of our analysis switches from the aggregate country level to the individual level. We investigate the roles that an individual's social identities play in shaping her tax attitude. Our goal is to identify micro evidence that may help explain the detrimental impact of ethnic fractionalization on the public's tax morale found in the previous subsection.
14 Coefficient estimates of the covariates are omitted from Table 2 due to page limits but are available upon request. 15 Results are omitted for brevity but are available upon request.
The ordered probit specification is given by: 
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The demographics variables include age, gender, marital status, educational background, and occupation (see Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein 1998 for a review). We also try to control for the level of household income. Since the income variable is scaled differently across countries we follow Alm and Torgler (2006) and use self categorization of income groups (e.g., upper class, upper middle class, lower middle class, working class, or lower class) as a proxy for household income.
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The lower class is used as the omitted category. Empirical evidence on the effects of income on tax evasion is mixed.
Previous studies find that tax evasion is positively (e.g., Slemrod 1985) , or negatively (e.g., Alm, Jackson and McKee 1992; Fishlow and Friedman 1994) associated with taxpayer's income.
Other studies find zero correlation between tax evasion and income (Feinstein 1991) . The effects of income on tax morale are also difficult to predict since they are contingent on various unobservable factors such as risk preferences, income tax rate progression, and opportunity costs of time (Alm and Torgler 2006) . As elaborated in Alm and Torgler (2006) , when the tax system is progressive, the high income individuals may have lower tax morale than the low income individuals if the increase in potential benefit through tax evasion dominates the decrease in marginal utility of income. On the other hand, the low income individuals may have lower tax morale since their social stakes are lower compared to the high income individuals. Therefore, it is an empirical question to investigate how tax morale is affected by income. The vector   in the ordered probit specification denotes the corresponding coefficients of these covariates.
Since forty out of the sixty seven countries in EWVS (wave 4) lack ethnic and/or citizen identity information, we include twenty seven countries with individual respondents' data.
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Data are weighted to reflect the national distributions of key demographic variables. Each country is weighted equally to avoid a large sample bias in the pooled-country analysis.
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The ordered probit results are presented in Table 3 . Columns (1) - (4) [ Table 3 that the citizen identity is significantly associated with a higher tax morale. This supports hypothesis 3. We also find that respondents who trust more in their government tend to have higher tax morale (p < 0.01). Controlling for trust in government does not change the effects of the identity variables, as we compare results in Column (1) - (4) with Columns (5) - (8). This suggests that ethnic identities and citizen identities have direct influence on tax attitudes which can be separated from the effect of trust in government.
Results in Table 3 also support hypothesis 4. We find that both the impact of Majority and Citizen is contingent on the ethnic fractionalization of the country. Specifically, the interaction of Majority and Fract has a positive and significant effect (p < 0.05) in all the specifications. It implies that although a majority group identity reduces levels of noncompliance attitude, this effect is weakened in more heterogeneous countries. This phenomenon may be interpreted by the majority group's lack of trust in other groups' honesty in paying taxes. It may also be interpreted by their lack of interest in paying taxes to support other groups. In short, the majority identity contributes to higher levels of tax morale more effectively in homogeneous countries than in heterogeneous ones. The effect of the citizen identity (Citizen) also depends on the country's population heterogeneity. The Citizen and Fract interaction has a negative and significant effect (p < 0.10 in column 7, p < 0.05 for all other cases). It indicates that the citizen identity further reduces one's moral acceptance of tax cheating in heterogeneous countries compared to in homogeneous ones. It suggests the role that the citizen identity plays in promoting tax morale is more important in heterogeneous countries.
Effects of other control variables are generally consistent with findings in the literature.
For example, men and younger people tend to consider tax cheating more justifiable. This is consistent with the evidence found in studies using tax return data, i.e., men are more likely to cheat on taxes than women, and noncompliance is significantly less common and of lower magnitude among elderly taxpayers. Our results suggest that married respondents are less likely to report tax cheating as justifiable, although previous studies based on tax return data show that noncompliance is more common and of greater magnitude among married households (Feinstein 1991) . We also find that the education level has positive effect on tax morale. The positive (but insignificant) coefficients of the Upper Class and Upper Middle Class variables suggest that tax morale tends to worsen as income increases. However, tax morale does not seem to change monotonically with income. Interestingly, respondents who self identify as the working class have higher tax morale than all other income groups (p < 0.05).
The micro evidence found in this subsection offers an explanation for why aggregate tax morale is higher in homogeneous countries than in heterogeneous ones. Recall that taxpayers from ethnic minority groups exhibit lower tax morale than majority groups, and greater ethnic differentiation of a society decreases the intrinsic compliance motivation of majority groups.
This suggests that the detrimental impact of heterogeneity may be driven by the low level of tax morale by the relatively large minority population and by the adverse effect of ethnic fragmentation on the majority group's compliance attitudes.
Micro Evidence from the U.S.
In this subsection, we analyze the effects of individuals' identities on tax attitude in the U.S.
Despite the large volume of tax compliance literature that uses the U.S. data, this topic has rarely been studied primarily because of data constraints. An exception is Beron, Tauchen and Witte (1992) that uses the 1969 federal tax return data from the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement
Program, and finds a positive correlation between the noncompliance rate and the proportion of non-white population in the U.S. communities. This finding is left unexplained because the data is aggregated at the three-digit zip code level. In this subsection, we use the U.S. WVS survey data to investigate the causes of this correlation by studying the impact of individuals' ethnic and citizenship identities on compliance attitudes.
The empirical specification adopted here is the same as in the previous subsection. The country-specific intercepts and the interactive terms are dropped from the specification since only the U.S. data are used. The construction of the identity variables follows the same approach in section 3. In particular, Majority is coded as one for English-speaking, Christian, and nonHispanic white respondents. The ordered probit results are presented in Table 4 . The dependent variable CheatTax, scaled from one to ten, measures the level of noncompliance attitudes.
Column (1) [ In sum, evidence from the U.S. survey confirms the pooled cross-country results in subsection 4.2 that ethnic majority groups exhibit higher tax morale than minorities. Since the boundary drawn between the majority and minority here is highly correlated with the differentiation of white and non-white population, it offers some explanation for the lower compliance rate in the U.S. communities with higher proportion of non-white population as in Beron, Tauchen and Witte (1992) .
Conclusion
This paper investigates the relationship between social identities, ethnic fragmentation and tax morale. We study two measures of social identities: (1) identity based on externally observable ethnic, linguistic, or religious characteristics, and (2) internalized identity based on self-reported sense of citizenship. We find that both dimensions of identities influence people's tax morale and the effects are contingent on the level of the society's ethnic fragmentation. These findings are consistent with the aggregate level evidence that ethnic fragmentation hurts tax morale, and suggest a micro mechanism for the aggregate evidence. The results imply that ethnic heterogeneous countries may face a higher cost of tax collection than homogeneous ones, which imposes constraints on their public sector performance.
While this paper focuses on the differences in tax morale between the majority and minority groups we do not interpret these differences as being driven by biological or ideological differences between specific racial or religious groups. Instead, we view these differences as proxies for how strongly a taxpayer identifies with her society. Although one's true identification cannot be measured empirically it is reasonable to believe that the majority groups on average have a stronger identification than the minority groups. Hence, the finding that the former has higher tax morale implies a positive correlation between tax morale and the level of identification. Similarly, we do not interpret an ethnically fragmented country as being This study also shows how the effects of individuals' identities on tax attitudes are translated to the impact of ethnic heterogeneity on the public's overall tax morale. This micromacro link leads to actionable policy recommendations. For example, tax authorities may consider targeted advertising to minority groups in order to increase identification. Advertising may stress similarities among all taxpayers and their common needs, e.g., we all use the roads, all our children need to be educated, we all face concerns around retirement, unemployment can happen to anyone. The common identity theory (Gaertner 2000) The entire filing process, including registration, tax forms, help files, error messages and live telephone support, is in Spanish. This innovation has significantly helped sales and use tax filing by Latino businesses. One mechanism through which this might operate is to increase the identification these business owners feel with their society.
Moreover, the empirical findings of this paper highlight the considerable promise of nourishing citizen identity. They suggest that tax authorities consider investing in motivational capital to complement conventional tax enforcement strategies of deterrence and material incentives. Since taxpayers who assume a salient citizen identity have stronger intrinsic motivation to comply with tax laws, authorities may promote the spirit of citizenship -a consensual understanding of shared goals and common values. This implication is especially helpful for ethnically fragmented countries where a strong sense of citizenship is related to increased tax morale. Note: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance level notation: * at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. Specification (1) includes log(PC tax revenues). Specification (2) includes log(PC tax revenues), and legal origins (French civil law, German civil law, Scandinavian law, and socialist law; common law is the omitted category). Specification (3) includes log(PC tax revenues), legal origins, and democracy index. Specification (4) includes log(PC tax revenues), legal origins, democracy index, geographic regions (Africa and Middle East, East and Southeast Asia, and Latin America; Europe and North America is the omitted categories), and the Gini coefficient. Observations are weighted within countries and the sums of weights are equalized across countries. Occupations and the country fixed effects are included. Coefficients are omitted for brevity. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance level notation: * at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. Observations are weighted within the U.S. dataset. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. Occupations are included in column (3) and the coefficients are omitted for brevity. Significance level notation: * at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. 
